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SUMMARY 
This report attempts to indicate the current status of Space Shuttle 
cargo handling analysis. It is intended for use by the various organizations 
operating in support of the Space Shuttle effort who are investigating problems 
not necessarily affected by the frequent configuration and approach changes 
imposed on the primary task team and contractor personnel. 
The various studies have been analyzed and the results interwoven 
with the results of in-house efforts. The problems involved in orbital 
docking, payload extraction and transfer, cargo handling, and special-
purpose missions are discussed and some tentative conclusions and 
recommendations are presented. 
This report has been reviewed and approved for release by the MSFC 
Shuttle Task Team. However, no statements made herein should be inter-
preted as position statements with respect to the Space Shuttle, the direction 
of futUre efforts, or intended methods of operation. This document reflects 
the view of the author, following analysis of the data available, and should 
not be construed as an official recommendation. 
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AN ANALYS I S OF POTENTIAL S PACE SHUTTLE 
CARGO-HANDLI NG MODES OF OPERATION 
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The past decade has seen rather significant advancements in our 
overall capabilities as a space-faring nation. The orbital payloads have 
increased from the size of a basketball to the size of the 6- to 12-man space 
stations now possible with Saturn V type vehicles. However, NASA is now 
engaged in an effort to develop a low-cost means of transporting large pay-
loads to earth orbit so that a balanced space program can be conducted with 
significantly lower delivery costs. 
During the last few years, several studies have been made of Space 
Shuttle concepts that would provide this capability. These initial studies 
were sized to accommodate payloads on the order of 10 000 pounds and 3000 
cubic feet. In 1969, however, four funded studies were conducted that 
considered transportation of payloads up to 50 000 pounds with volumes up 
to 23 000 cubic feet. In addition, one unfunded study was conducted by the 
Martin Marietta Corporation. The results of these studies are given in 
References 1 through 5. 
Using the results of these studies and the guidelines used by these 
contractors, a study has been conducted of the cargo handling to be performed 
with the currently envisioned modes of operation for this vehicle. This 
report attempts to indicate the current status of the Space Shuttle cargo-
handling analysis and is intended for use by the various organizations operating 
in peripheral support of the Shuttle efforts. All of the vehicle interfaces 
discussed are intended to be representative of the current Shuttle concepts. 
The traffic mix basis for this study is that presented in Reference 6. 
This model is shown in Table 1 and, with updating, is the one used by the 
contractor study teams in their recently completed efforts. This model 
indicates that the contemplated use of the Shuttle will be for propellant 
delivery, personnel and cargo delivery and special missions. Although the 
expected Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates for the various program 
elements have changed since this model was originally issued, it is still 
believed that the traffic mix and general utHization patterns are appropriate 
for mission analysis. Therefore, the following discussion is divided into 
these three categories. 
TABLE 1. NASA MISSION TRAFFIC MODEL 
tv 
YedY of Operation Total Percentage 
Mission 1 2 3 4 I 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Traffic of Total 
Delivery of Propellants 
Liquid Hydrogen (LH2 ) 36 36 24 24 24 24 24 24 216 44.5 
Liquid Oxygen (L02 ) 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 36 
Personnel and Cargo Delivery 
Space Station 
Personnel and cargo 4 4 4 4 4 20 \ 
Experiment module 3 3 3 3 3 15 j 
Space Base 
Personnel and cargo 20 20 20 20 20 20 120 38.9 
Experiment module 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 ( 
Lunar Missions (Crew and Cargo) (j 6 (j 6 (j 6 6 6 48 
I 
Delivery of Propulsive Stages and 
Payloads 1 7 8 3 4 6 5 2 7 5 3 51 9. 0 
Placement, Retrieval, Service, and 
21 Maintenance of Satellites 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 3.8 
I i i Short Duration Orbit/Space Rescue 2 2l 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 3.8 
LTotal Flights Per Year 12 18 19 62 63 67 66 63 68 66 64 568 100. 0 
SECTION II. PROPELLANT DELI VERY 
One recent version of the Integrated Space Program (ISP) [7) 
indicates a possible buildup to a 1980 earth-orbital population of about 60 
persons and a lunar population of perhaps 12 persons, with a possible 
requirement for about seven flights of a Nuclear Shuttle annually between 
earth orbit and lunar orbit to provide the needed supplies and personnel 
changeovers of this lunar population. The currently envisioned Nuclear 
Shuttle will consume about 300 000 pounds of liquid hydrogen (LH2) per 
round trip or, for this frequency, about 2. 1 million pounds per year. 
Preliminary studies have established that a permanent Orbital 
Propellant Storage Facility (OPSF) with a capacity of about 150 000 cubic 
feet for LH2 may be needed to improve the efficiency of the overall program. 
If this facility were also used as a resupply depot for the postulated Space 
Tug, as a filling station to supply LH2 and oxygen propellants for high-
energy, large payload propulsive stages for interplanetary missions (those 
which could not be launched from earth fully loaded), and as a supply depot 
for the Space Station, then it also may prove advantageous to have liquid 
oxygen (L02) storage capability aboard, perhaps as much as 1000 cubic feet. 
Delivery of the propellants to this facility, or directly to anyone of 
the major operational elements involved, could be accomplished by direct 
fluid transfer or by transfer of the propellant with its tank (container) as an 
integral unit. Three possible concepts for such a facility are shown in 
Figure 1. For propellant delivery, the largest volume requirements would 
be in connection with LH2• Thus, a 50 OOO-pound Space Shuttle payload 
capacity could possibly be utilized as given in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. LIQUID HYDROGEN CARGO-PAYLOAD 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
Item Volume (ft3) Weight (ib) 
Liquid Hydroger;t (4. 37 lb/ft3) 10 000 43 000 
Ullage, Baffles, etc. 700 2 000 
Tankage, Insulation, etc. 500 4 000 
Transfer Mechanism 500 1 000 
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SATURN V LAUNCHED 33' DIA. SPHERICAL TANKS 
,po. 
SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCHED 15' DIA. x 60' TANKS 
SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCHED 15' DIA. x 60' TANKS 
Figure 1. OPSF concepts (using rotational acceleration for transfer). 
On this basis, it is estimated the the Shuttle cargo bay would possibly 
need an open, usable volume of not less than 12 000 cubic feet. If the 
hydrogen were transported to orbit in a slush condition (30-percent slush, 
1. 05 psia, 25° R), then this volume requirement could possibly be decreased 
by about 1000 cubic feet. However, the change from slush back to liquid 
would ultimately utilize 10 300 cubic feet with no allotment for ullage, etc. 
The current cargo-bay dimensions of 15 feet in diameter by 60 feet in length 
provide a total volume of about 10 600 cubic feet. 
Recent studies of orbital refueling techniques and systems [8,9,10] 
suggest that fluid transfer of propellant alone from the Space Shuttle to the 
orbital storage facility in a neutralized gravity environment would be strongly 
limited by available technology. Metallic bladders for use in a positive 
expulsion method of fluid transfer do not appear to be available for use with 
cryogenics such as L02 and LH2• Discussions with persons working in 
cryogen technology areas also suggest that such capability will probably not 
be available in the time frame currently being discussed (the late 70's). 
All three of these studies [8,9,10] concluded that fluid mechanics 
(behavior) knowledge with respect to orbital transfer of cryogenic propellants 
is currently (and in the foreseeable future) insufficient for the design of 
fluid transfer systems to be operated in a neutralized gravity field. Therefore, 
it now appears that the propellants will have to be transferred from the Space 
Shuttle to the OPSF in an integral propellant/tank mode and from the OPSF to 
other systems in an artificial gravity field. This field can be created either 
by rotational or linear acceleration of the postulated tank farm. The concepts 
shown in Figure 1 would utilize rotation; linear acceleration would be used 
with configurations such as shown in Figure 2. 
The use of rotational acceleration may bring technology problems in 
the areas of seals for nonrotating transfer hubs and attachments, coriolis 
acceleration effects, stabilization and control requirements, spin and despin 
thruster systems, etc. The linear acceleration mode of transfer may 
encounter both operations and technology problems in the areas of orbit 
changes, facility orientation, transfer times, etc. Additional investigation 
into the technology of cryogen transfer and into the solution of the potential 
problems enumerated above would probably be desirable. 
The transfer of fluids in earth orbit will, generally, be affected by 
operation in the orbital environment. Some of the potential effects are: 
5 
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Figure 2. OPSF (linear acceleration transfer concept). 
1. The general weightlessness of the fluids may cause problems in 
maintaining the desired liquid/ gas interfaces, in orientation of the fluids, and 
in acquisition of the fluids by transfer devices such as pumps, etc; however, 
it appears that these problems will not be present if fluid transfer is conducted 
in an artificial "g" mode of operation. 
2. Al though the presence of a hard vacuum will be beneficial in case 
of spills, this vacuum may also present problems with respect to seals, 
micrometeoroid puncture, outgassing of materials, etc; however, it appears 
that the adoption of a tank exchange mode of operation for maintaining the 
propellant depot would tend to minimize these problems. 
3. Use of Shuttle personnel to assist in the fluid transfer operations 
may be restricted or minimized because of the support equipment imposed 
limitations. If man is to operate outside of ~he Shuttle (in an extravehicluar 
manner - EVA), then life support, communications, thermal protection, 
and other links of support - in addition to rescue capability - will be needed. 
If he is to operate from within the Shuttle (in an intravehicular manner - IVA), 
then limitations may be imposed by the space available, view angles, 
monitoring activities, use of manipulators, etc. 
However, the IVA mode of operation appears to present the least 
number of problems and in conjunction with development of a quick-disconnect 
tank exchange system for the tank farm appears to hold forth the greatest 
promise of success. 
In addition to the possible technology difficulties mentioned above, the 
transfer process should also consider the effect of transfer efficiency. If it 
is assumed that each fluid transfer is 95-percent efficient, then double 
transfer of the propellant from the Shuttle to the OPSF in a fluid-only mode 
results in the Nuclear Shuttle receiving only about 90 percent of the propellant 
sent into orbit. The 10 percent is lost to residuals, leakage, boil-off, etc. 
Whereas, the use of the tank-pIus-propellant method of operation can 
potentially effect an immediate 5-percent gain in utilization of propellant 
delivered to orbit. Thus, it appears that both available technology and 
operational efficiency tend to favor transfer of the propellant to the OPSF in 
a combined tank-pIus-propellant method. Figure 3 presents one possible 
concept of this operational mode. 
The problems associated with the physical transfer of the integral 
propellant tank units to the tank farm (OPSF) core are discussed in the 
section dealing with personnel/ cargo operations because of the similarity 
to anticipated operational methods and potential problems which may be 
encountered in that area. 
7 
Figure 3. Delivery of propellant to the OPSF. 
8 
SECTION III. PERSONNEL AND CARGO DELIVERY 
A. General Req u i rements 
The Space Shuttle is intended to transport personnel and/ or cargo to 
and from a manned Space Station and later on to a large Space Base research 
complex operating in low-altitude earth orbit. The personnel to be transported 
will include specially trained astronauts and nonastronaut-trained individual 
scientists and engineers who will conduct specific scientific and technology 
experiments and/or operations. The cargo will include foods, liquids, and 
gases in addition to experiment modules and operations-type equipments. 
Therefore, these Space Shuttle missions will be comprised of both long-Iead-
time scheduled resupply and crew rotations as well as unscheduled, 
discretionary flights. The actual cargo mix for the Space Station will depend 
on the number of men aboard and the type of operations and experiments 
being carried on at any given time. A recent estimate of quarterly require-
ments for a 12-man Space Station (provided by the MSFC Space Station Task 
Force during the study) is summarized in Table 3. 
TABLE 3. ROUTINE LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS FOR 
A 12-MAN SPACE STATION (PER QUARTER) 
Up - Personnel 
Cargo 
Down - Personnel 
Cargo 
12 men 
12 000 lb 
12 men 
7 000 lb 
The Space Station studies now in progress may change these figures; 
however, the changes discussed to date would not negate the utility of these 
numbers for this analysis. 
B. Modular Approach 
The common-carrier mode of operation conceived for the Space 
Shuttle system requires efficient use of a minimum fleet of vehicles in 
logistics support of the Space Station/Base as well as a broad spectrum of 
9 
alternate missions. Fast turnaround for payload transfer is important to 
economic effectiveness, both on the ground and in orbital operations. This 
leads directly to functional requirements for standardized container modules 
and pallets that decouple payload preparation cycles from the logistics flight 
scheduling on the ground and in orbit. Additional functional requirements 
for deployment of modules in the vicinity of the Station/Base, or externally 
attached in some instances, must be recognized. 
The Shuttle cargo bay, typically 15 feet in diameter, 60 feet long, 
and about 10 000 cubic feet in volume, is similar to that of cargo aircraft 
in that it has no provisions for cargo accommodation other than hard points 
for primary structural support loads. Therefore, payload accommodation 
weights must come out of the nominal 50 OOO-pound capability of the vehicle. 
Data currently available from commercial and military air cargo experience 
indicate a minimum penalty of about 1. 25 pounds per cubic foot of total 
weight for packaging all types of cargo. This includes the weight of 
containers for separation and structures to withstand basic flight and landing 
loads and to be retained within the airframe. The extrapolation of this 
information by LMSC [2] indicates payload accommodation weights on the 
order of 20 to 25 percent of the Space Shuttle's nominal 50 OOO-pound capability. 
During this study, two principal modes of cargo accommodation and 
transfer to the Space Station/Base have been considered (Fig. 4). One is the 
unpressurized accommodation of bulk containerized cargo with a pallet or 
space frame accepting the structural loads; the other is a pressurized 
cylindrical module with bulkheads and internal racks. 
For the unpressurized pallet case, it was assumed that the Space 
Station/Base would be fitted with a large airlock or hangar that could accept 
the entire pallet from the Shuttle for subsequent unloading by the Space 
Station/Base crew. The pallet would translate into the airlock in a rigidly 
docked configuration. This type of operation would probably involve cycling 
of the airlock with each logistic operation. 
The pressurized compartment of the alternate mode would include 
the necessary passenger accommodations on some flights in a mixed cargo/ 
personnel mode of operation. One method of transfer would involve operations 
in a rigidly docked configuration. The pressurized compartment would 
translate out of the payload bay under mechanical constraint and connect with 
a hatch interface to accommodate pressurized transfer of personnel and cargo. 
With the weight penalty for cycling the airlock included, typical weights 
associated with delivery of an unpressurized pallet range between 8000 and 
10 
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Figure 4. Two possible cargo accommodation and transfer modes. 
11 000 pounds, depending on whether a pump-down cycle is used or makeup 
atmosphere is provided as part of the logistics payload. Delivery of a full-
size pressurized module costs about 10 000 to 12 000 pounds for either the 
hard-docked or stationkeeping modes. Thus, as indicated earlier, noncargo 
weight penalties appear to be on the order of 20 to 25 percent, making this a 
key aspect of future analysis of methods to achieve effective use of the Shuttle. 
If the pressurized mode with the compartment docked to the Station/ 
Base is assumed, a number of cargo-handling considerations must be 
evaluated. Manual handling is limited by crew capabilities and time to 
small articles. Very limited NASA and DOD effort in zero-g cargo 
handling and transfer has been accomplished in the KC-135 aircraft 
simulation and in some underwater simulation. Guidelines indicated some-
thing less than a 24-inch cube for one man and a 20- by 30- by 40-inch 
object weighing no more than 250 pounds for two men. Based on these 
assumptions, it would take approximately 200 trips over an average round-
trip distance of 60 feet to empty the 15- by 60-foot compartment loaded 
with 200-pound containers, or about four 8-hour shifts for two crewmen to 
handle the 40 000 pounds of cargo. One conclusion indicated by the extent 
of this activity is that the Shuttle should not remain on orbit awaiting cargo 
transfer both up and down; another is that mechanical aids are required. 
Furthermore, one concept suggested for future study is to use a 
15- by 30-foot or a 15- by 15-foot pressurized cargo/passenger module 
deployed from the Shuttle as a semipermanent warehouse (or "pantry") 
attached to the Station/Base, thereby eliminating a requirement to off-load 
cargo before the Shuttle can de orbit and return. In this mode of operation, 
the cargo is off-loaded as needed and the cargo/passenger module filled 
with return cargo as needed in preparation for a return flight. The operations 
profile would then amount to an exchange with the Shuttle of standardized 
up-and-down cargo modules on each logistics flight, allowing the Shuttle to 
return immediately to earth. The only anticipated need for on-orbit linger 
would then be facilitation of the crew overlap/exchange time. 
This same concept of utilizing a modular approach was applied to 
each of the proposed missions as layouts of the typical payloads indicated 
that such an approach was technically feasible. In addition, the approach 
appears to offer the following advantages: 
1. Minimize Space Shuttle ground turnaround time - The mission 
peculiar modules could be prepared in advance and loaded into the cargo 
bay with minimum interfacing with the orbiter vehicle. 
12 
2. Maximize the Space Shuttle performance - Mission peculiar 
provisions and equipment would not be incorporated into the orbiter and 
subsequently carried on missions not requiring them. 
3. Minimize the interface problems - Clean interfaces, mostly 
attachments for structural support and/ or deployment, could be defined 
between the orbiter and the various payloads. 
These advantages thus indicate that a modular approach to payload 
handling could be very attractive to the Space Shuttle program. 
C. Module Sizing Analysis 
Analysis of the potential payloads has tentatively indicated that the 
Space Station crew-rotation and resupply missions would lend themselves 
well to a modularization approach. These two missions are discussed below. 
The satellite service and the experiment module missions are discussed in 
Section IV. 
The requirements for the missions shown in the Traffic Model 
(Table 1) indicate the possible need for personnel in addition to the two-
man orbiter crew. This potential need includes the rotation of the Space 
Station crew, the delivery of men to manned satellites, and the other special 
missions. Figure 5 (from Reference 1, Volume VIII) presents a breakdown 
of the possible personnel requirements for the various missions. This study 
[ 1 J indicated that the two most-desirable personnel module sizes were those 
incorporating provisions for either 4 or 12 men. The 12-man module could 
handle the 10- and 6-man missions, and the 4-man module could cover the 
rest. Thus, according to this study, these two modules, along with the two-
man crew, could handle 535 of the currently envisioned 568 missions. 
D. Comparison of 4-Man Module and 6-Man Orbiter Cabin 
According to the analysis reported in Reference 1, the 4-man 
personnel module could be used on 325 of the currently envisioned 568 
missions. This 4-man module (compared with the 12-man module) could 
possibly introduce both a payload compartment volume reduction and weight 
reduction because of the decreased structure and subsystems requirements. 
An alternative to the 4-man module would be a 6-man orbiter cab. Schematic 
concepts of the various options are shown in Figure 6. This 6-man cabin 
13 
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could provide the necessary personnel requirements without reducing the 
payload volume and with a probable weight reduction in supporting sUbsystems. 
An increase in size of orbiter subsystems such as EPS, LSS, and ECS would 
replace the duplication of such systems when a separate module is used. 
Use of the 4-man module in the cargo bay has some advantages, such 
as direct visibility, via a viewing point in the module walls for orbital 
operations. The 4-man module would be used for personnel responsible for 
placing ahd retrieving satellites, delivering propellant, and delivering 
propulsion stages and payloads. If these operations were to be performed 
from the orbiter cab, indirect viewing such as TV would have to be provided 
or an aft control station would be required. The module or aft control 
station would require a computer for checkout functions or use of the orbiter 
avionics on a time-share basis. 
If a 6-man (including crew) cabin were designed into the orbiter, it 
could also be used for those missions previously requiring a 12-man module. 
The result would be that the previous 12-man module could be resized for 
8 men and would thus be 10 feet in length. It is estimated that such a module 
would weigh about 7200 pounds. When used as a cargo module, it would 
weigh about 5000 pounds. The orbiter 6-man cab capability would now be 
able to be used for 94 percent of the missions. The only exception is the 
experiment module delivery missions that will be discussed below. 
These Space Shuttle studies have resulted in an indication that the 
Ilpantryll approach to cargo/personnel handling may possibly be the "best 
way to go. 11 This approach could provide a very flexible Space Shuttle with 
the capability to handle 12 000 pounds and 12 men (up) and 7000 pounds and 
12 men (down) for resupply of the Space Station on a quarterly basis, and 
the ability to handle a lunar mission requiring 6 men and 20 000 pounds every 
2 months. 
The ground rules used (some changed between the start of the study 
contracts and the completion of the NASA IS effort) for this analysis were: 
a. The Shuttle will not hard dock with the Space Station or Space 
Base. The general docking operation is discussed later in this report. 
b. All docking ports, transfer tunnels, whatever will have a clear 
circular area, 5 feet in diameter. 
c. All parts of the Shuttle system will have maximum reusability. 
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d. Airline-type operations will be employed with respect to ground 
handling, cargo restrictions, etc. 
e. Intact mission abort capability will be designed in. 
f. Personnel transfer will be in a shirtsleeve environment. 
It was anticipated that the most-likely mode of operation would be to 
carry 6 to 12 passengers on a mission, attach the "pantry" module to the 
Station, retrieve an empty module with its return to ground cargo and 
personnel and return to earth surface - probably a 2-day mission for the 
Shuttle. Salient features of the contemplated module are: 
a. Selfsustaining. The interfaces with the Shuttle are limited to the 
needed physical attachments to take the launch, ascent and descent loads, 
and the attachments (if any) of the deployment/retraction mechanism. 
b. Seats only, no sleeping facilities. 
c. Five-foot docking port, without airlock provisions. 
d. Mixed-gas atmosphere of 10 psi (or 14.7 psia - same as Space 
Station) . 
e. EC/LSS systems sized for 12 men for 7 days - based on the 
following consumption rates: 
Food 
Metabolic oxygen 
Water (drinking & food prep. ) 
Water (personal sanitation) 
Atmosphere leakage allowance 
2.0 pounds/man-day 
1. 68 pounds/man-day 
6.99 pounds/man-day 
2.3 pounds/man-day 
10 percent (vol. ) per 
day 
On this basis, both LMSC and GDC investigated the detailed cargo-
handling provisions of a pressurized cargo/personnel module (pantry). The 
LMSC module weight estimate was about 11 000 pounds; the GDC estimate 
was 10417 pounds (this may need to be increased to provide meteorite 
protection if the "pantry" approach is used). 
The cargo-handling problem, as currently foreseen, is to achieve an 
internal module-accommodation arrangement that permits ease of access 
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and avoids clogging of the working area by bulky items. When loading the 
cargo (either on the ground or in orbit), the back sides of packages are 
against the walls and are generally inaccessible; therefore, the cargo would 
probably be secured from the front. One possible cargo-handling system 
envisioned as an integral part of the pressurized module is shown in Figures 
7 and 8. 
This cargo-handling system would thus provide restraint of the 
cargo containers at all times during the unloading operations; any shape of 
container could be handled. The cargo module would have a center access 
tunnel, and the containers would be mounted around this center tunnel, 
attached to the outer shell of the cargo module. The cargo-handling system 
would consist of a pallet to which the containers would be secured for 
unloading. The pallet would slide along on two sets of parallel end tracks 
which, mounted in a circular end ring, could rotate around within the end 
ring; therefore, the rails and the pallet would be raised and lowered by an 
electrically driven, closed-loop cable system at each of the end tracks. An 
electric motor-driven roller system at one end ring would provide the power 
to rotate the platform within the module. 
Containers could vary in shape and size, but all containers would 
have to pass through a common hatch (5 feet in diameter at present). The 
containers may be 3 feet deep and may vary from 5 to 10 feet or more in 
length, depending on storage room volume and shape at the Station/Base. 
Their weights may range up to 2000 pounds. The container structure would 
have to take the launch loads, typically up to 3 g's vertical and up to 2 g's 
transverse. The cross-sectional shapes of containers may be circular, 
rectangular, or trapezoidal, and several shapes may be used within one 
module. 
The emphasis in the studies was on a minimum of module/orbiter 
interfaces. This has been achieved and a mechanical-only interface concept 
is recommended. This concept would allow the orbiter to be sized to firm 
requirements and the payloads to be sized and designed for their own unique 
mission requirements as they are developed. This restriction to a mechanical 
interface is also the most desirable when considering various alternate 
personnel and cargo-transfer concepts. 
E. Integral Propellant/Tank Transfer Operations 
The delivery of propellant tanks to an OPSF is presently seen as very 
similar to the operations associated with the delivery of cargo/personnel 
modules to the Space Station. The potential problems, as currently foreseen, 
are discussed below. 
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Quick connects/disconnects for the attachment of propellant tanks 
containing about 43 000 pounds of LH2 are believed to be the major problem 
associated with the integral tank-transfer concepts. Various tank-farm 
concepts have been studied recently and some of these concepts are shown 
in Figures 1 and 2. One possible tank-transfer methodology is shown in 
Figure 3. 
Most of the applicable pump work to date has been done in connection 
with systems used to feed propellents to vehicle engines, including chilldown 
and recirculation pumps. Some consideration should possibly be given to 
the use of such pumps presently on board the basic OPSF structure rather 
than on each separate tank unit. 
One advantage of pump application for fuel transfer, instead of their 
use as engine feed pumps, is that the pressure-rise requirements will, in 
general, be significantly lower. This situation will allow consideration of 
axial flow and all-inducer-type pumps in place of the centrifugal-type pumps 
used with present-day vehicles. Operation with low inlet pressures is 
important to minimize pressurant requirements and axial flow, or all-
inducer pumps should lend themselves well to this type of operation. 
The use of gas or vapor to expel propellant from storage tanks is a 
well-established technology and these methods may be applicable to the 
transfer of fluids in space under an artificial-g field; however, analytical 
studies have shown that there may be an increased potential of gas blow-
through during low-g draining operations. 
The OPSF interface is currently defined as the piping, structural 
hardware and control subsystems connecting the 15- by 60-foot tank to the 
core and pumping section through which the cryogenic propellant is transferred 
to the Nuclear Shuttle or other vehicles. Basic problems with the rigid, 
quick disconnect system are, in general, the same as ground transfer, 
except that hardware weights, reliability, and remote operation are believed 
to be more critical. The OPSF core/tank interface needs reliable leak-
tight coupling connections and shutoff valves. In addition, since cryogenic 
fluids are involved, chilldown of the core pumps, piping, and insulation in 
each major transfer operation may require special venting systems. 
Tanker studies to date have tentatively indicated that a rigid support 
structural concept would be best for the following reasons: 
• Feasibility of automatic hookup is increased. 
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• Attitude control sequencing is minimized. 
• Little or no structural stress is placed on propellant lines. 
• Ability to use acceleration-settling methods (either rotational or 
linear) is improved. 
It is currently envisioned that the mechanics of coupling would be 
similar to that used for aircraft inflight refueling. Since there will be no 
aerodynamic perturbations, the boom extension and guidance could possibly 
be both similar and simpler. The design and operation of the OPSF tanks 
and core will probably encounter venting/pressure buildup problems. 
Therefore, orbital experiments to define the behavior of cryogens are 
strongly recommended. One method of placing a propellant tank on the OPSF 
is shown in Figure 9. This, of course, is a major area of Shuttle operations 
that should be exposed to additional tradeoff studies before a final selection 
of operational methods is made. 
F. General Docking Considerations 
1. General Control Considerations. The problems of docking the Space 
Shuttle with the proposed Space Station, the OPSF, the Nuclear Shuttle, and 
the other proposed units of the ISP hardware are currently considered of 
major import, maybe even of overriding importance with respect to the 
operational aspects of an Independent Space Program. 
The principal factors to be considered in docking operations are 
restrictions on the orientation and/ or maneuverability of the Space Station 
and the possibility of both manual and automatic modes of operation - at the 
option of the flight crew. In considering what modes of operation are desired, 
both hard-docking (the Shuttle direct to the Station) and stationkeeping modes 
should be included. At least during the initial phases of the ISP, the Shuttle, 
as it is now foreseen, will be substantially larger than the Space Station and 
the potential physical interference possibilities with antennas and other 
devices deployed from the Station may make the close approach of the Shuttle 
to the Station a potential hazard to this equipment, the Station, and/or the 
Shuttle. However, these difficulties should not be considered insurmountable. 
In general, the maneuvering required of the Shuttle in a direct docking 
operation or the attachment of modules to the Space Station will require very 
careful, preCise control; and a collision in any respect will involve potentially 
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Figure 9. Space Shuttle propellant tank transfer concept [ 1) . 
hazardous damage to the Shuttle's heat shield, engines, and control surfaces 
and/ or damage to the Space Station's structure, communications, attitude 
control systems, etc. Fully automatic docking systems have not yet been 
developed, and the requirements for precision laser or r['. L .... : ::lystems for 
sensing and complex vehicle onboard guidance and control and dynamics 
computations have not been satisfied. Manual systems based on the piloting 
skills of the astronauts have been well demonstrated on the Gemini and 
Apollo vehicles; however, these vehicles were much smaller than the 
contemplated Space Shuttles and Space Stations. With the much-larger 
masses, the inertial and attitude sensing skills of flight crew members may 
no longer be adequate, and the larger physical offsets between eyeball, 
docking ports, and vehicle centers of gravity are expected to generate complex 
motions (real or apparent) during the fine maneuvers required. In addition, 
the approach and docking of the vehicles will probably be limited by the 
visibility/illumination constraints and the sun angles. 
Use of manual control with the proposed large logistics vehicles is 
expected to involve or evoke apparent control-axes cross-couplings during 
docking. The resultant control disharmonies would produce the potential 
for greater propellant consumption, increased time requirements, and 
larger error for docking maneuvers than flight experience to date would seem 
to indicate. These potential effects would be intensified whenever the 
docking-capture mechanism is out of the field of view, and the pilot is 
required to use a docking target located at a different position than the 
primary docking contact point. 
Figure 10 shows the control geometry system used by Lockheed [ 2] 
in their study of this problem. This reference system has orthogonal 
rotational axes intersecting at a common center of rotation, which coincides 
with the vehicle center of gravity, parallel motion translation along these 
same axes, and thrust aligned through the center of gravity. The character-
istics of current manned spacecraft and logistics vehicles as presently 
envisioned were approximated. In Gemini and Apollo, the docking mechanism 
was centerea and the eyepoint would almost coincide with the rotational center. 
The docking line of sight has been along a control axis, normally roll. 
As vehicles become larger (i. e. , Space Shuttle and Space Station) , 
the systems design influences will probably generate wide separations 
between the axis and the observation points. This, in turn, may possibly 
lead to manual-control disharmonies. As an example, when the eyepoint is 
on the roll axis but not at the center of rotation, pitch or yaw motions appear 
to have heave or sway components. The magnitude of these components 
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Figure 10. Docking control geometry [2] . 
increases with eye-point separation from the center of rotation. Separation 
of the docking mechanism center from the roll axis generates apparent 
pitch and yaw rotational changes at the docking contact point when a roll 
maneuver is executed. Other considerations such as thrust misalignments 
and control sensitivities may also interact and further affect these 
disharmonies. 
It is currently anticipated that soft-docking operations would encounter 
similar control problem situations. 
2. Visibility and Illumination. In addition to the Shuttle maneuver factors, 
consideration should be given to visibility at time of docking. This visibility 
will depend on three factors: (1) the ambient illumination of the objects 
within the field of view will be determined by the geometric relationships 
existing among the Shuttle, the target vehicle, the sun, and the earth; 
(2) contrast within the field of view, especially glare and shadow, will be 
determined by the shapes and surface conditions of the two vehicles; and 
(3) the window position and field of view, both size and shape, will interact 
with the first two factors to determine the occurrence of sun shafting through 
the viewports and the scene veiling effects caused by scatter within the window 
itself. It is anticipated that difficulties with visibility will tend to increase 
propellant consumption, error possibility, and safety hazards during the 
docking operations. Considerations for visibility will probably constrain 
the location and orientation of the docking ports, the design of capture/ secure 
mechanisms, and the target design associated with each docking location. 
During the Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle (ILRV) study, 
Lockheed made an analysis of docking with a Space Station which was modeled 
as a cylinder using solar arrays for the primary power supply. This con-
figuration (Fig. 11) was equipped with side-docking ports which were assumed 
to be oriented such that the docking maneuver centerline was perpendicular 
to the Space Station centerline. The Station was oriented with the solar arrays 
perpendicular to the sun's rays and with the roll axis parallel to the sun's 
rays. 
The logistics vehicle model used in this analysis was a Space Shuttle 
docking in a nose-in attitude. Sunlight incidence angles between 60 and 140 
degrees were assumed to be acceptable (Fig. 12). For sun angles of less 
than 60 degrees, sun shafting through the docking viewport or sun incidence 
causing veiling (light scatter in the viewport optics) are distinct possibilities. 
For sun angles of greater than 140 degrees, the Shuttle's own shadow may 
cause obscuring of the Space Station docking port and target. It was also 
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assumed that the sun-angle constraints were the same for all vehicle roll 
positions with respect to the sunline. This constant sun-angle constraint for 
all vehicle roll angles may be inappropriate for the many complex Shuttle 
shapes being investigated. Additional study is probably warranted. 
The LMSC analysis also made the following assumptions: 
• All docking would be performed in daylight, in zero-g flight modes, 
in a 270-nautical-mile orbit with a 55-degree inclination, and with no 
reorientation of the Space Station to accommodate the docking maneuvers. 
• All external Space Station surfaces were highly reflective 
(greater than 50 percent) and lambertian diffuse, except for the solar arrays 
with their solar cells' 20-percent reflective and highly specular mounts of 
matte-finished aluminum with cell-to-mount packing factors of 0.80 to 0.85. 
• Sky or dark earth served as background during the docking maneuver, 
with the port illuminated (in order of preference) by the sun and earth 
reflection, by the sun only, or by earth reflection only. 
Flat Space Station surfaces are preferable to curved surfaces in the 
active vehicle field of view during docking maneuvers - a condition which 
could probably be very difficult to attain in most cases. 
When the Space Shuttle is operated under the preceding assumptions, 
it presents the simplest case for analysis as a constant attitude with respect 
to the sunline is maintained at all times. A 11 cylinder-side docking ports 
are acceptable from a sunline standpoint as the sun angle to the Shuttle is 
always 90 degrees. 
Operating under the assumption that all docking is performed in 
daylight, all dark-end docking operations are unacceptable as the docking 
port is not illuminated by the sun or earth and the Shuttle crew is looking 
directly into the sun. The sun-end port, with the docking approach parallel 
to the Station center lines , is unacceptable because the sun angle is greater 
than 140 degrees and the docking port and target will probably fall in the 
Shuttle'S own shadow area. In addition, this approach is close to or in the 
glare envelope resulting from the highly specular solar-array cells since 
the solar-array plane is nominally perpendicular to the sunline. However, 
sun-end approaches offset 45 degrees from the Space Station centerline 
result in a sun angle of 135 degrees and may be acceptable, providing this 
pattern is outside of the solar-array glare envelope. 
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Both direct-sun and earth-albedo illumination of the Space Station 
docking port and target are desirable. Earth-albedo considerations alone 
provide no obvious criteria for the location of the docking port and its 
target. The earth-side docking maneuver approaches provide both the 
desirable dark-sky background and the most-nearly optimum illumination 
condi tions. 
3. Docking/Cargo-Transfer Considerations. In considering the docking/ 
cargo-transfer operations there were five major problem areas concerning 
payload transfer which appeared to merit investigation: 
• How is the payload to be extracted from the orbiter vehicle? 
• How is the payload to be transferred from the orbiter to the 
Space Station? 
• How is the payload to be docked with the Space Station or other 
hardware unit? 
• How is the payload transferred back to the orbiter from the 
Space Station? 
• How is the payload returned to the cargo bay of the orbiter vehicle? 
In addition, there are two other questions which are related to these 
five and which concentrate on the crew and passengers: 
• Is it desirable to have an access tunnel connecting the crew cabin 
and payload bay (cargo hold)? 
• Is it necessary or desirable to have a quick-egress tunnel for 
the passengers from the cargo bay to the outside? 
The above seven questions were analyzed and are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
a. On-Orbit Payload Extraction. The removal of the payload from 
the Shuttle's cargo bay can be accomplished with one of four general modes: 
• In an orbiter-initiated and controlled mode. 
• In a payload-initiated and controlled mode. 
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• In a Space Station-initiated and controlled mode. 
• In a mode of operation initiated and controlled by a maneuver-
able third vehicle; i. e. , by the Space Tug. 
In addition, anyone of these four modes could possibly employ any 
of the following specific methods: 
• Translation devices such as: (1) telescopic pushers, (2) worm 
gear pushers, (3) loaded springs, (4) scissor extenders, (5) cable reel-in 
devices, and (6) pneumatic devices. 
• A sWing-out docking rig. 
• Payload attached to the cargo bay door that swings it out 
during opening. 
• Space Station removes payload using winches, booms, or 
manipulator arms. 
• Space Tug docks with payload still in cargo bay or partially 
deployed by translational devices such that the payload is clear of the cargo 
bay doors. 
• Payload removes itself through use of self-contained propulsion 
units. 
These representative payload-extraction concepts are shown in 
Figure 13. An assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each mode 
of operation is presented in Table 4. 
Based on the assessment shown in Table 4, the use of two-way 
translational devices is selected as the recommended mode for on-orbit 
payload extraction. The other methods tend to exhibit major limitations on 
possible alternate missions and/or serious dynamic problems. 
b. On-Orbit Payload Transfer. Once extracted from the cargo bay 
of the Shuttle's orbiter vehicle, the payload is ready for transfer to the 
Space Station or another operational unit, such as the propellant facility or 
Nuclear Shuttle. Four of the apparently more-promising methods available 
for this task are the following: 
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TABLE 4. 
METHOD 
Translational Devices (a) 
Swing-Out Docking Ring (a) 
Swin" -Out On uoor (a) 
(b) 
Space Tug (a) 
(b) 
Space Station Arm/Boom (a) 
Payload Removes Self (a) 
PAYLOAD-EXTRACTING CONCEPT ASSESSMENT 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
For 2 -way push and hold devices -- (a) Weight charged against payload. 
can be used for alternate missions. (b) Some are one -wa y o:lly devices. 
(c) Mechanisms require volume and 
may interface with system 
p~acement . 
Can ~e used for alternate missions. (a) Weight charged against payload. 
(b) Mechanism requires volume and 
rna y interface with system 
placement. 
(c) Translate and swinJ mechanism 
may be exceedingly large. 
Ca n be used for alternate missions. (a) 'Mechanism requires volume and 
Only one operation. may interface with system placemen-::. 
(b) Dynamic forces on door and door 
hinges may be excessive. 
Can be used for some alternate missions. (a) Requires third vehicle. 
No internal mechanisms required. (b) Requires docking while payload is 
i still in payload hay. 
(c) Possible problem with door interference. 
(d) Alternate missions requiring removal 
of payload canister (away from station) 
cannot be performed. 
No internal mechanisms required. (a) Difficult payload attachment. 
(b) Dynamic forces on Space Station 
may be excessive. 
(c) Lift out stability hard to control. 
(d) Alternate missions requiring removal 
of payload canister (away from station) 
cannot be performed. 
Can be used for alternate missions. (a) Weight charged against payload. 
(b) Requires additional hardware on 
payload canister. 
(c) Likely plume impingement on orbiter 
vehicle. 
(d) Return to orbiter payload bay is difficult. 
~------' 
• Extension and attachment of control/reel-in arms by the 
Space Station (or other mission element) in conjunction with the Shuttle's 
translational devices. 
• Pushing or pulling by the Space Tug. 
• Use of a self-contained propulsion system. 
• The Space Station moves to the payload. 
Each of these potential methods is illustrated in Figure 14. An 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each method is presented 
in Table 5. As a result of this assessment, the choice narrows down to two; 
namely, the two-step boom control by the Space Station and Space Shuttle and 
the use of the Space Tug. The self-propelled concept is third and should be 
considered if the boom control proves to be impractical. Further study is 
considered desirable before a final selection is made. However, for the 
purpose of this analysis, the two-step extension by the Shuttle and boom 
control by the Space Station was tentatively selected as the preferred mode 
of transfer/docking operation. An illustration of this method is shown in 
Figure 15. 
The use of the Space Tug, as envisioned in the McDonnell 
Douglas ILRV study [4), is shown in Figure 16. It should be noted that the 
payload is translated out of the Shuttle! s cargo bay to a point clear of the 
doors before the Space Tug docks to it. This is accomplished by a two-way 
translational device similar to that proposed earlier for use with the two-step 
transfer that did not use the Tug. 
c. Payload Docking Concepts and Analysis. There are many concepts 
whereby the Shuttle's payload may be attached (docked) to the Space Station. 
Six of these possible docking configurations are listed below and are illustrated 
in Figure 17. 
1. Payload end to Station end. 
2. Payload end to Station side. 
3. Payload side to Station side. 
4. Payload side to Station end. 
5. Payload taken in through Station end. 
6. Payload taken in through Station side. 
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TABLE 5. ON-ORBIT PAYLOAD TRANSFER ASSESSMENT 
METI-IOD ADVANTAGES DlSADV ANT AGES 
Autonomous Control • Goocl visibility for Station docking. • Maneuvering system weight 
• Simple system. charged against payload. 
• Adaptable to different docking 
configurations. 
Use of Space Tug • Docking mechanisms only additional • Requires use of third vehicle. (Pushing) hardware required. • Poor visibility for docking to 
• Simple system if Space Tug already Space Station. 
existing . 
• Adaptable to different docking 
configurations . 
Use of Space Tug • Docking mechanisms only additional • Requires use of third vehicle. (Pulling) hardware required. • Limited docking configurations. 
• Simple system if Space Tug already • Requires separate Space Tug for 
existing. each payload canister. 
• Good visibility for Station docking. • Space Tug must have go-through 
pressurized tunnel. 
Space Station Cable • Goocl visibility for payload attachment • Introduces dynamic forces on 
Arm/Boom Withdrawal to Station. Space Station. 
• Very little additional hardware required • Orientation of payload may be 
on payload. difficult to control. 
Space Station Comes • Simple system. • Maneuvering propellant requirement 
to Payload • Good visibility for Station -to -payload excessive, particularly as Station 
docking. buildup continues. 
• Docking mechanisms only additional 
hardware required. 
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Figure 17. Methods of docking payload to Space Station. 
An assessment of each of the above configurations is presented 
in Table 6. On the basis of these assessments and using the payload (Station 
interface complexity as the prime judging criterion), configurations 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 appear to offer the most promise. Of these, configuration 1 (payload 
end to Station end) was tentatively selected as the preferred mode. 
d. On-Orbit Payload Return Transfer. The potential methods 
available for retrieval of the payload from the Space Station back to the 
Shuttle's Orbiter vehicle are similar to those for the reverse situation 
(Orbiter to Station) . Thus, the use of the Space Station boom concept in 
conjunction with the translational device aboard the Shuttle was tentatively 
chosen as the preferred mode of operation. 
e. On-Orbit Payload Placement in Orbiter. The return of the 
payload back into the Orbiter for return from orbit is somewhat different 
from its original deployment (extraction). Here, the payload is pulled back 
into the cargo bay. On the basis of having the simplest system for the entire 
on-orbit mission, a mechanical attachment approach (payload grabbers) was 
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6. 
CONFIGURATION 
Payload End to 
Station End 
Payload End to 
Station Side 
Payload Side to 
Sta tion Side 
Payload Side to 
Station End 
Payload Inserted 
into Station End 
Payload Taken in 
Through Station 
Side. 
TABLE 6. DOCKING CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENT 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
(a) Simp!e. (a) Some attitude control problems 
(b) Minimal payload - Station introduced to Station. 
interface. 
(c) More contact surface than 1. 
(a) Simple. (a) Some attitude control problems 
(b) Minimal payload - Station introduced to Station. 
interface. 
(a) Simple. (a) Some attitude control problems 
(b) Small payload - Station introduced to Station (less than 
interface. 1). 
(a) Simple. (a) Some attitude control problems 
(b) Minimal payload - Station introduced to StatiO;} (less than 
interface. 1) • 
(a) Maximum area available for (a) Some attitude control problems 
cargo/passenger transfer. introduced to Station. 
(b) Large payload - Station 
interface. 
(c) Docking is more difficult 
than 1. 
(a) Maximum area available for (a) Some attitude control problems 
cargo/passenger transfer ~ introduced to Station. 
(b) Large payload - Station interface. 
(c) Docking is more difficult than 2. I 
selected as the preferred system for payload retrieval. These grabbers 
would be installed as part of the translational device used for unloading the 
payload from the Orbiter vehicle. The device locks onto the payload, the 
payload is translated back into the cargo bay, and the access doors are 
closed and secured. Note that this concept improves the versatility of the 
Shuttle with respect to alternate missions. 
f. Crew Access Tunnel Assessment. There has been con-
siderable discussion to date regarding the desirability of incorporating a 
crew-cabin-to-payload access tunnel into the basic Shuttle's Orbiter design. 
An investigation into this possibility was conducted during the recent studies; 
the advantages and disadvantages of such a tunnel [4] are given in Table 7. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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TABLE 7. CREW-CABIN-TO-PAYLOAD 
TUNNEL ASSESSMENT 
ADVANTAGES 
Crew has ready access to the payload compartment for on-
orbit operations and to assist in providing increased alter-
nate mission capability. 
Provide capability for transfer of the Shuttle crew to the 
Space Station via a cargo or cargo/personnel module. 
Provides a possible alternate escape route during abort 
situations. 
DISADVANTAGES 
~dditional pressurization and power requirements. 
Uses volume otherwise available for Shuttle sUbsystems. 
May interfere with Orbiter's propellant tank placement. 
May necessitate a change in the basic vehicle moldline. 
One possible placement arrangement for such a tunnel is shown 
in Figure 18. This tunnel, as shown, would run along the top center of the 
Orbiter connecting the crew cabin, whether 2- or G-man, to the payload bay. 
PAYLOAD BAY 
AND PAYLOAD 
CREW-ACCESS TUNNEL 
CREW CABIN 
Figure 18. Crew-access tunnel placement [4]. 
The most important advantages of having such a tunnel and the 
areas that make its existence worthwhile are that it gives the crew 
access to the payload area while on orbit, thus providing the vehicle increased 
alternate mission capability and allowing the crew to transfer IV A to the 
Space Station via the crew/cargo module. 
g. Passenger Safety - QUick On- Pad Exit. Shuttle studies to 
date have made provisions for total personnel loads (passengers and crew) 
ranging from a low of 2 to high of 50 persons. With this number and spread 
of personnel to be accommodated, it has been considered mandatory that 
some me~hod of quick escape should be provided for on-the-pad emergency 
situations. Five possible procedures (Table 8) were investigated by 
McDonnell- Douglas in their recent ILRV study [4] . 
Of possible alternatives given in Table 8, the use of a quick-
exit tunnel (alternative 1) was judged to be the quickest and the simplest. 
However, the depth provided by the recent ILRV studies was not considered 
sufficient and further analysis of the safety procedures is strongly recom-
mended. 
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TABLE 8. METHODS OF ON-PAD PASSENGER 
QUICK EXIT 
• Blow hatch in payload canister, traverse tunnel, open 
hatch in payload doors, slide down cable 
• Open payload doors, translate payload canister out, 
open hatch in payload canister, slide down cable 
• Open payload doors, remove payload canister, transfer 
entire payload canister to safe area 
• Open hatch in payload canister, climb through crew-
access tunnel, escape through crew quick-egress 
hatches, slide down cable 
• Blow hatch in payload canister, open payload doors, 
slide down cable 
The advantages and disadvantages of these five methods are 
given in Table 9. On the basis that a quick-exit tunnel is the preferred 
method of extracting the passengers in an emergency situation, an assess-
ment was made of the desirability of incorporating such a tunnel into the 
baseline Orbiter vehicle. The advantages and disadvantages of the use of 
such an escape system are shown in Table 10. 
This tunnel is presently envisioned as a nonpressurized unit 
attached to one of the cargo bay doors. At the cargo bay door there would 
be a hatch and at the payload canister-tunnel interface there would be another 
hatch (the smaller one). Both of these closures would be quick opening 
devices blown outwardly open (safely) on abort command. The tunnel 
would be quite short-extending only from the payload module to the cargo 
bay doors. It might be advisable to position it in an inclined manner when 
the Shuttle is in a vertical, launch position to provide for more rapid exit 
of the passengers. 
h. Payload-Handling Facilities. On-orbit-handling facilities are 
not described in detail although some major items of handling equipment can 
at this time be identified. The preferred mode of cargo transfer has been 
previously identified as the "pantry" concept wherein the Shuttle and Station, 
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TABLE 9. PASSENGER ON-PAD QUICK EGRESS METHOD ASSESSMENT 
METHOD ADVANTAGES DISADV AN TAG ES 
Escape Tunnel • Simple • Slow (probably fastest method) 
• Very little additional equipment 
• Minimal physical effort required 
of passengers 
Utilization of Onboard • Simple • Relatively slow (slower than 1) 
Translational Devices • Uses existing equipment 
• Minimal physical effort required 
of passengers 
Remove Payload • No physical effort required of • Requires heavy equipment 
Canister Intact passengers • Very slow 
• Complex 
Utilize Crew -Access • Simple • Prohibitively slow 
Tunnel • Uses existing equipment • Requires large physical effort 
by passengers 
No Escape Tunnel, • Simple • Relatively slow (slower than 1) 
Open Doors • Uses existing equipment • Nothing to bridge gap between 
• Minimal physical effort required payload and doors 
of passengers 
TABLE 10. QUICK-EXIT TUNNEL ASSESSMENT 
ADVANTAGES 
• Provides quick escape route for passengers for an on-
pad engines-down abort. 
eD Provides crew with alternate escape route for on-pad 
passenger loading mode with payload bay doors closed. 
DISADVANTAGES 
• Uses volume otherwise available for Orbiter sUbsystems. 
• May interfere with placement of Orbiter propellant tank (s). 
Note: With these in mind, and considering past events, it is 
recommended that such a capability be included in the basic 
vehicle design. 
acting in concert with each other, use translation devices and transfer a 
module from the Shuttle and dock it to the Space Station - with no hard 
docking attempted between the Shuttle and the Station. Docking hardware 
on the cargo/passenger module would be needed to attach it to the Space 
Station. 
Having attached the module to the Station, some means must be 
provided for transferring the cargo on an as-needed basis. Certain general 
items for this operation (i. e., handrails, quick disconnect tie-downs, etc. ) 
have been referenced earlier. However, some provisions will probably 
have to be made for transfer of larger, heavier, nonroutine cargo such as 
experiment or data-handling equipment. For items such as these, the 
required manually operated moving equipment could possibly be located on 
board the Space Station. This would allow its repeated use with numerous 
missions and allow for handling of heavy return cargo. 
In addition to the facilities for housing and transporting the passengers 
(scientists, engineers, technicians - all nonastronaut physical fitness types), 
some special provisions will need to be provided for loading, emergency 
situation unloading, seating while awaiting lift-off, environmental control 
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during the flight, and transfer of passengers to the Space Station. It is 
presently anticipated that a walk-on capability will be available from the 
service tower, that all passenger transport is in a shirt-sleeve environment, 
and that no passengers are involved in cargo transfer. 
45 
IV. SPECIAL MISSIONS 
It is currently envisioned that the special missions for the Space 
Shuttle will be primarily of three types: ( 1) delivery and deployment of 
propulsive stages and experiment modules, (2) placement, retrieval, and 
maintenance of satellites, and (3) short-duration orbit missions wherein the 
Shuttle serves as a small Space Station/ earth-observation vehicle, or it is 
used as a rescue craft. The potential mission cargo-handling procedures 
are discussed below. 
A. Del ivery a nd Deployment of Propu Is ive 
Stages a nd Payloads 
For these missions, a method of extracting the propulsive stage/ 
payload from the Shuttle while in orbit will be required. The attitude control 
system of the payload itself could possibly be used for this purpose; however, 
the limited space available for maneuvering inside the bay and the potential 
damage from exhaust impingement makes this an undesirable approach. 
Some mechanical method of deployment is therefore desirable. It is 
presently envisioned that this deployment scheme could possibly be quite 
similar, if not identical, to that used for deployment of the cargo/personnel 
module discussed earlier. Thus, the propulsive stage could be translated 
out of the bay and released ready for further activity. One possible concept 
of such an operation is shown in Figure 19. No specifiC deployment time has 
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Figure 19. Deployment of a propulsive stage/payload. 
been specified, but all systems investigated to date would allow deployment 
with very small induced loads in a time span of less than 5 minutes. 
A universal docking ring on the individual payloads may prove very 
desirable. Such a ring would allow either identical half, by desire or 
circumstances, to remain passive. Such a ring may prove to be especially 
attractive for manned payloads as it would allow for the passage of 
pressurized tunnels and their coupling devices through the inside of the ring. 
In addition to the normal docking requirements for impact absorption, 
capture, and mating, the capability for rotational positioning (indexing) may 
prove desirable during docking operations. Lateral support will be required 
for these payloads during re-entry, maneuvering, and landing. Since these 
support paths and pin-attachments locations are fixed, the propulsive stage 
may need to be rotated prior to retraction into and securing in the cargo 
bay. 
B. Satellite Placement, Retrieval, and Maintenance 
Figure 20 presents four possible concepts for servicing satellites in 
earth orbit. These concepts were investigated during the recent ILRV studies 
[ 1 J • 
In Concept A, the Shuttle would retrieve the inoperative satellite or, 
attached module, return it to earth for maintenance, and later, on another 
Shuttle flight, redeploy it in the desired orbit. This approach avoids the 
problems associated with maintenance performance in orbit, such as 
pressurized work areas and required repair equipment. However, two 
Space Shuttle round trips are required and the costs as,sociated with such 
a method may make this concept unattractive. This approach could be used 
with a minimum of modification to the Space Shuttle after the addition of a 
docking adapter - provided, of course, that the satellite already possessed 
docking provisions. 
In Concept B, it was assumed that the satellites deployed during the 
Shuttle'S operational timeframe would have in-orbit maintenance provisions 
incorporated. Such provisions would, as presently envisioned, include a 
pressurizable work volrnne and a docking port. Thus, the maintenance 
personnel could provide a supply of the components most likely out of 
commission, enter the satellite after docking, and effect the repair and 
reactivation. This concept would also minimize special requirements on the 
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Figure 20. Basic satellite servicing concepts [ 1J. 
CO[lcept B 
CO'lcept D 
Space Shuttle. The primary disadvantage entailed by this concept is that it 
would require all satellites have maintenance work volumes, etc., built in. 
Concept C envisions a Space Shuttle with a bui.lt-in pressurizable 
cargo bay that would provide a shirt-sleeve work environment for satellite 
maintenance. It is currently estimated that this would result in a 15 000-
pound penalty to the basic payload capability on all missions not requiring a 
pressurized payload bay. 
Concept D would use a pressurizable maintenance module in conjunc-
tion with a small 4- to 6-man module. These modules would be installed in 
the payload bay, equipped with the needed provisions, and while on orbit 
deployed to the desired operational position - one concept is shown in 
Figure 20. The end of the module is opened and the satellite is maneuvered 
into the module (via movement of the satellite or Shuttle or both), the end is 
closed, the module pressurized, the repairs or retrofits are effected, and 
the satellite is redeployed in the desired orbit. As presently envisioned, 
this concept would not unduly penalize the satellite or the Space Shuttle. 
Therefore, on the basis of maximum Shuttle versatility and minimum inter-
faces, this concept is recommended as the preferred mode of operation, 
pending further assessment. 
For most of these type missions, rendezvous and docking will be 
accomplished with a stable, controllable satellite. In some instances, 
however, the target may be tumbling about an arbitrary axis with no capabi-
lity for control. Such a condition could possibly exist in either a satellite 
retrieval/maintenance or rescue mission. 
One promising technique, which has been studied in connection with 
several different satellites, involves alignment of the capturing vehicle 
(in our case the Space Shuttle) such that the retrieval device is aligned with 
the rotational axis of the satellite, spinning up a retrieval mechanism to the 
target velocity, grappling the target, despinning the target, and then 
proceeding as with any other cooperative unit. 
It is presently considered quite likely that more than one technique 
may be employed for capture of various targets (both cooperative and non-
cooperative) by the Shuttle's Orbiter vehicle. The optimum method is 
expected to vary with type of target, spin rate, equipment deployed (solar 
panels), etc. In addition, the capture technique chosen may depend on 
whether the intent is to retrieve the target, dock with it, or only perform 
detailed inspection. 
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c. Short-Duration Missions 
The Orbiter stage of the Space Shuttle is currently envisioned as 
capable of performing as a short term (up to 30 days) orbital laboratory or 
sensor platform. In this mode of operation, the experimental equipment 
or module would remain in the payload bay as shown in Figure 21. If required, 
the doors could be opened to provide a more unobstructed view or for temporary 
deployment of sensors, etc. Some candidate missions currently considered 
for this mode of operation are the following: 
1. Earth surveys. 
2. Material science and processing experiments. 
3. Component tests and sensor calibrations. 
4. Human factors experiments (onboard centrifuge). 
A summary of possible earth-survey missions [1J is shown in Table 
11 along with an estimate of the nature of the survey and kind of sensors 
required. It is presently anticipated that the sensors and required support 
equipment would also be in modules for installation and use in the cargo bay. 
D. Res~ue 
Since many aspects of a Space Station design and operation (from the 
space environment through the crew behavior) are treated on a probability 
basis, provisions must be made for the occurrence of improbable events. 
Emergencies on board the Space Station could require emergency flights of 
the Space Shuttle to deliver cargo or evacuate passengers. 
The cargo flights will be used to deliver spares and components to 
repair system failures or damage caused by meteoroid impact, collision 
with other vehicles, or space debris. It may also be necessary to deliver 
expendables such as oxygen, nitrogen, and propellant to make up losses 
because of failure. The time available to deliver this cargo cannot be 
specified because of the multitude of possible emergencies and alternative 
courses of action available to the Station crew. However, if the malfunction 
or damage is repairable, the crew is probably not in serious danger for at 
least a few days, because of the compartmentized Space Station design. 
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Metric Cameras X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Panoramic Cameras X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Tracking Telescope X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Synoptic Cameras X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Radar Imager X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Radar Altimeter /Scatterometer X X X X X X 
Wide-Range Spectral Scanner (O-M X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
R Spectrometer X X X X X X X X X X X 
R Radiometer X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Microwave Imager (Passive X X X X X X X X X X 
Microwave Radiometer X X X X X X X X X X X X 
UV Imager /Spectrometer X X X 
Laser Altimeter /Scatterometer X X X X X 
Absorption Spectrometer X 
Radio Reflectometer X X X X X 
Magnetometer X X X X 
Gravity Gradiometer X X X X X 
Ground Sensors X X X X X X X X X X 
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The more critical situations are those requiring the emergency 
evacuation of crew members or abandonment of the Sration entirely. Some of 
the major events that could result in such emergencies are listed in Table 12, 
with possible courses of action. The availability of a rescue vehicle is 
necessary if the Station is to be abandoned immediately. 
TABLE 12. POTENTIAL MAJOR SPACE STATION 
EMERGENCIES 
A bandon the Station immediately 
1. Excursion of nuclear power source. 
2. Major explosion and/ or fire. 
Quick rescue required (within hours) 
1. Severe solar flare. 
2. Nuclear burst. 
3. Major failure of power subsystem. 
4. Major failure of life support subsystem. 
5. Sick or injured crew member. 
6. Station damaged caused by meteoroid impact. 
Planned rescue possible (within days) 
1. World situation - threat of war. 
2. Major failure of critical subsystem (i. e. , Station 
maintenance) . 
These emergency situations may impose stringent requirements on 
the Space Shuttle if it is to operate as an efficient rescue craft. The first 
and perhaps the most critical requirement possibly imposed would be that of 
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rapid response. The Space Shuttle should be capable of being loaded with 
emergency cargo, where necessary, and launched at the first reasonably 
available window. After the contact is made in orbit, it should be capable 
of returning within 24 hours or have provisions on board for life support and 
maintenance of the rescued persons. 
It may be necessary to transfer personnel from an unpressurized 
station. This type action would normally require either an airlock or the 
ability to depressurize the Space Shuttle for the transfer. In addition, the 
mobility of the personnel may be severely reduced by the inflated space 
suit. Special personnel modules could be used for this rescue mission. 
The capability for rendezvous and possible docking with a noncoopera-
tive target may be required when the Station is damaged. The only assistance 
that could be anticipated from the target vehicle would be a simple beacon. 
Extravehicular transfer of personnel and some cargo may be required if 
some portion of Space Station is inoperative. 
Further analysis of the possible rescue situations and appropriate 
responses is now in progress and the results will be reported later. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the study effort discussed in this report, the tentative 
conclusions in the following paragraphs have been reached. 
A. Tentative Conclusions 
1. A cargo/personnel module delivered by the Shuttle may possibly 
be able to handle all of the logistics needs of the Space Station. This unit 
could be transferred in a two-step operation to the Station by deployment-
extraction-translation devices aboard the Shuttle. This cargo/personnel 
module will weigh approximately 12 000 to 15 000 pounds, will be pressurized 
to the same pressure as the Space Station, and should be designed to remain 
on orbit in a !!pantry" type of operation for 90 days. 
2. A docking procedure may be possible whereby neither the standoff 
condition (requiring development and use of a Tug) nor the "hard-dock!! 
condition is required. This two-step translation scheme allows the cargo/ 
personnel module to be delivered and the previous one picked up in a few 
hours so that no significant on-orbit loiter time is required. However, some 
Shuttle loiter may be required if a significant crew overlap period is desired. 
3. A crew-cabin payload bay tunnel is desirable and should probably 
be included as a requirement in all future Shuttle design efforts. 
4. A cargo/personnel module to cargo bay door escape tunnel may be 
needed as an integral part of all future design effort. 
5. The Space Shuttle will probably be handling its propellant delivery 
tasks in a manner quite similar to the way it delivers other cargo and 
personnel. Therefore, it is presently envisioned that the propellant and its 
container tank will be transferred as an integral unit. 
B. Recom mendations 
In addition to the above conclusions, this study has resulted in the 
following reccommendations: 
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1. Study effort in the area of cargo handling should be continued with 
the results of the various contracted efforts being integrated and reported on 
a periodic basis. 
2. Additional investigation should be initiated into the technology 
of orbital cryogen transfer and into the potential engineering problems (quick 
disconnects, rotating seals, etc.) associated with an orbital propellant 
storage facility. 
3. Additional trade-off studies should be conducted with regard to 
the desired or required propellant line and subsystem interfaces associated 
with the use of the Shuttle for delivery of cryogenic propellants to orbit. 
4. Additional investigation should be initiated on systems tradeoffs 
associated with a 6- or 8-man Orbiter cab versus a cargo/personnel module. 
5. The docking procedures analyses have not resulted in any firm 
conclusions to date. Therefore, it is recommended that further effort be 
expended in the examination of possible methods. It is also recommended 
that this investigation include dynamics, stability, and reaction control 
analysis. 
6. Additional tradeoff studies are recommended to examine the 
desirability of a Space Tug for on-orbit transfer of passengers/ cargo, in 
comparison with translation devices or other methods. 
58 
REFERENCES 
1. Space Shuttle - Final Technical Report. General Dynamics-Convair 
Division, San Diego, California, GDC-DCB69-046, Contract NAS9-9207 
(MSFC), October 31, 1969. 
2. Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle - Final Report. Lockheed 
Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale, California, LMSC-A959837, 
Contract NAS9-9206 (MSFC), December 22, 1969. 
3. Spacemaster - A Two-Stage Fully Reusable Space Transportation System. 
Martin-Marietta Corporation, Denver, Colorado, M-69-36, December 
1969. 
4. Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle Systems. McDonnell-Douglas 
Corporation, St. Louis, Missouri, MDC E0049, Contract NAS9-9204 
(MSFC), November 1969. 
5. Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicle Systems. North American Rockwell 
Corporation, Downey, California, SD 69-573, Contract NAS9-9205 
(MSC), December 1969. 
6. NASA Space Shuttle Summary Report. Prepared by the NASA Space 
Shuttle Task Group, June 1969. 
7. Integrated Space Program - 1970-1990. MSFC Internal Note 
IN-PD-SA-69-4, Huntsville, Alabama, December 1969. 
8. Burge, G. N.; Blackmon, J. B.; and Madsen, R. A.: Analytical 
Approaches for the Design of Orbital Refueling Systems. McDonnell-
Douglas Astronautics Company, Presented at the AIAA Fifth Propulsion 
Joint Specialist Conference, June 1969. 
9. Boretz, J. E.: Orbital Refueling Techniques. TRW Systems Group, 
Presented at the AIAA Fifth Propulsion Joint Specialist Conference, 
June 1969. 
10. Wood, C. C.; and Trucks, H. F.: Evaluation of Experiment and 
Analytical Data for Orbital Refueling Systems. NASA-Marshall Space 
Flight Center, Presented at the AIAA Fifth Propulsion Joint Specialist 
Conference, June 1969. 
59 

DIS TR I BUT I ON 
INTERNAL 
DIR 
DEP-T 
AD-S 
PD-DIR 
Dr. W. R. Lucas/J. T. Murphy 
Dr. W. A. Mrazek 
PD-RV 
Mr. O. C. Jean 
Mr. L. F. Lawson 
Mr. W. Corcoran 
Mr. J. Fikes 
Mr. A. Finzel 
Mr. H. Kroh 
Mr. M. Akridge 
Mr. J. Mack/F. Hammers 
Mr. R. Wolf 
PD-SS 
Mr. W. A. Brooksbank 
Mr. H. R. Palaoro 
Mr. J. H. Brown 
Mr. G. A. Keller 
Mr. R. E. Lavender 
Mr. K. K. Dannenberg 
Mr. T. A. Barr 
Mr. R. Barraza 
Mr. J. R .. Bramlet 
Mr. R. W. Hunter 
Mr. G. P. Pedigo 
Mr. H. K. Brown 
PD-PP-DIR 
Mr. B. Sneed/J. Jackson (5) 
PD-PS-DIR 
Mr. J. C. Goodrum/W. Lucero 
PD-PS-S 
Mr. V. L. Looney 
PD-MP-DIR 
Mr. J. A. Downey/H. Gierow 
PD-MP-A 
Mr. J. R. Olivier 
Mr. O. Guffin 
PD-MP-S 
Mr. C. C. Dailey (3) 
PD-MP-T 
Mr. W. T. Carey (5) 
PD-MP-P 
Mr. H. Dudley (5) 
PD-DO-DIR 
Mr. E. Goerner 
Dr. H. Thomason 
Mrs. F. Andrews 
PD-DO-S 
Mr. W. R. Marshall (5) 
PD-DO-SR 
Mr. L. B. Allen (3) 
PD-DO-SI 
Mr. C. R. Darwin (3) 
PD-SA-DIR 
Mr. W. G. Huber/L. Spears (5) 
61 
D I STR I BUT I ON (Concluded) 
PD-SA-O 
Mr. G. von Tiesenhausen 
Mr. D. Cramblit 
Mr. E. Butler 
Mr. W. Thompson 
Mr. W. Stafford 
Mr. W. Whitacre (75) 
A&TS-FAC-DIR 
Mr. H. A. Schultze 
PD-SA-L 
Mr. T. H. Sharpe 
Mr. E. Valentine 
Mr. C. Rutland 
PD-SA-V 
Mr. A. Orillion 
PD-SA-P 
Mr. R. J. Harris (3) 
A&TS-PAT 
Mr. L. D. Wofford, Jr. 
PM-PR-M 
A&TS-MS-H 
A&TS-MS-IP (2) 
A&TS-MS-IL (8) 
A&TS-TU (6) 
EXTERNAL 
NASA Headquarters 
Mr. P. Culbertson, MLA 
Mr. D. Lord, MTD 
Dr. F. Dixon, MTY 
Mr. T. Hagler, MTY 
Mr. R. Lohman, MTY 
Mr. R. Lovelett, MTY 
Mr. B. Noblitt, H-1 
Mr. M. Waugh, MTP 
Mr. E. Hall, MTG 
Mr. M. Markey, MTG 
Mr. N. Peil, MTG 
Mr. D. Schnyer, MTV 
Dr. J. Wild, MTE 
Mr. W. Armstrong, MTX 
Dr. H. Hall, MTX 
Dr. R. Johnson, MTX 
Mr. J. Mason, MOG 
Langley Research Center 
Mr. E. Love, Code 186 
Kennedy Space Flight Center 
Mr. M. Preston, DE/M 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Mr. R. Thompson, LA (25) 
Mr. J. Hodge, HA 
Scientific and Technical Information Facility (25) 
P. O. Box 33 
College Park, Maryland 20740 
Attn: NASA Representative (S-AK/RKT) 
62 
